Abstract-We consider an adversarial Bayesian signal processing problem involving "us" and an "adversary". The adversary observes our state in noise; updates its posterior distribution of our state and then chooses an action based on this posterior. Given knowledge of "our" state and sequence of adversary's actions observed in noise, we consider three problems: (i) How can the adversary's posterior distribution be estimated? Estimating the posterior is an inverse filtering problem involving a random measure -we formulate and solve several versions of this problem in a Bayesian setting. (ii) How can the adversary's observation likelihood be estimated? This tells us how accurate the adversary's sensors are. We compute the maximum likelihood estimator for the adversary's observation likelihood given our measurements of the adversary's actions where the adversary's actions are in response to estimating our state. (iii) How can the state be chosen by us to minimize the covariance of the estimate of the adversary's observation likelihood? "Our" state can be viewed as a probe signal which causes the adversary to act; so choosing the optimal state sequence is an input design problem. The above questions are motivated by the design of counter-autonomous systems: given measurements of the actions of a sophisticated autonomous adversary, how can our counterautonomous system estimate the underlying belief of the adversary, predict future actions and therefore guard against these actions.
I. INTRODUCTION

B
AYESIAN filtering maps a sequence of noisy observations to a sequence of posterior distributions of the underlying state. This paper considers the inverse problem of reconstructing the posterior given the state and noisy measurements of the posterior; and also estimating the observation likelihood parameter and designing the state signal. That is we wish to construct an optimal filter to estimate the adversary's optimal filtered estimate, given noisy measurements of the adversary's action. Such problems arise in adversarial signal processing applications involving counter-autonomous systems: the adversary has a sophisticated autonomous sensing system; given measurements of the adversary's actions we wish to estimate the adversary's sensor's capabilities and predict its future actions (and hence guard against these actions).
A. Problem Formulation
The problem formulation involves two players; we refer to the two players as "us" and "adversary". With k = 1, 2, . . . denoting discrete time, the model has the following dynamics:
Let us explain the notation in (1): p(·) denotes a generic conditional probability density function (or probability mass function), ∼ denotes distributed according to, and • x k ∈ X is our Markovian state with transition kernel P x k−1 ,x and prior π 0 where X denotes the state space.
• y k ∈ Y is the adversary's noisy observation of our state x k ; with observation likelihoods B xy . Here Y denote the observation space.
• π k = p(x k |y 1:k ) is the adversary's belief (posterior) of our state x k where y 1:k denotes the sequence y 1 , . . . , y k . The operator T in (1) evaluated at x ∈ X is the classical Bayesian filter [1] T (π, y)(x) = B x,y X P ζ,x π(ζ) dζ
Let Π denote the space of all such beliefs. When the state space X is Euclidean space, then Π is a function space comprising the space of density functions; if X is finite, then Π is the unit X − 1 dimensional simplex of X-dimensional probability mass functions.
• a k ∈ A denotes our measurement of the adversary's action based on its current belief π k where A denotes the action space. More explicitly, the adversary chooses an action u k as a deterministic function of π k and we observe u k in noise as a k . We encode this as G π k ,a k . Thus G is the conditional probability (or density if A is continuum) of observing action a given the adversary's belief π. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. variables. In the graphical model, the shaded nodes π 0 , x 0:k , a 1:k are known to us at time k, while the white nodes are computed by the adversary and unknown to us. This is in contrast to classical Bayesian filtering where y 1:k is known to us and x k is to be estimated, i.e, π k is to be computed.
B. Objectives
Given (1), this paper considers the following problems:
• Inverse Filtering: How to estimate the adversary's belief given measurements of its actions (which are based on its filtered estimate of our state)? Assuming probability distributions P, B, G are known, estimate the adversary's belief π k at each time k, by computing posterior p(π k | π 0 , x 0:k , a 1:k ). From a practical point of view, estimating the adversary's belief allows us to predict (in a Bayesian sense) future actions of the adversary. In the design of counter-autonomous systems, this facilitates taking effective measures against such actions.
• Covariance Bounds in Localization: Localization refers to estimating the underlying state x when the transition kernel is identity; so state x is a random variable. We consider the case where both us and the adversary do not know x. For the Gaussian case, we consider a sequential game setting involving us and the adversary estimating the underlying state. The setup involves two cascaded Kalman filters where the first Kalman filter feeds its estimate to the second Kalman filter, and the second Kalman filter feeds its estimate to the first Kalman filter. We show that the asymptotic covariance is twice as large as classical localization that uses Gaussian measurements together with a single Kalman filter.
• Parameter Estimation: How to remotely calibrate the adversary's sensor? Assume P, G are known and B is parametrized by vector θ. Compute the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of θ given x 0:N , a 1:N for fixed data length N . From a practical point of view, this determines the accuracy of the adversary's sensor.
• Optimal Probing: The transition kernel P determines our random signal x which "probes" the adversary's sensor. What choice of P yields the smallest variance in our estimate of the adversary's likelihood B?
C. Examples 1) Calibrating a Radar: Here "us" refers to a drone/UAV or electromagnetic signal that probes an adversary's sophisticated multi-function radar system. The adversary's radar records measurements y k of the drones kinematic state x k and its Bayesian tracking functionality computes π k . The radar resource manager then chooses an action u k (e.g. waveform, beam orientation/aperture) and our inference/measurement of this action is a k . The above objectives then boil down to estimating the adversary's tracked estimate so as to predict its future actions (inverse filtering); determining the accuracy of the adversary's radar system (parameter estimation), optimizing the drone's trajectory to estimate B accurately (optimal probing).
2) Electronic Warfare: Suppose x k is our electromagnetic signal applied to jam the adversary's radar (e.g. a cross polarized signal where the phase evolves according to a Markov process). The radar responds with various actions. Our aim is to determine the effectiveness of the jamming signal; B models the likelihood of the radar recognizing the jamming signal, π k denotes the radar's belief of whether it is being jammed; and a k denotes the action we observe from the radar.
3) Interactive Learning: Although we do not pursue it here, the above model has strong parallels with those used in personalized education and interactive learning: x k denotes the quality/difficulty of material being taught; B models how the learner absorbs the material; π k models the learner's knowledge of the material and a k is the response to an exam administered by the instructor. The instructor aims to estimate the learner's knowledge and the learner's absorption probabilities to optimize how to present the material.
Simplifications: This paper makes several simplifying assumptions. First, we assume the adversary knows our transition kernel P to compute the Bayesian belief using (2) . In reality the adversary needs to estimate P based on our trajectory; and we need to estimate the adversary's estimate of P . Second, we assume that the adversary's sensors are not reactive -that is, it does not know that we are probing it. If the adversary is a reactive low probability of intercept (LPI) radar, it will attempt to confuse our estimator resulting in a dynamical game. Both these simplifying assumptions point to a more general game-theoretic setting; which is the subject of future work.
D. Organization, Related Works and Context
Counter unmanned autonomous systems are discussed in [2] . Specifically, [2, Fig. 1 ] places such systems at a level of abstraction above the physical sensors/actuators/weapons and datalink layers; and below the human controller layer. This paper extends our recent works [3] - [5] where the mapping from enemy's belief π to action a was assumed deterministic. Specifically, [3] gives a deterministic regression based approach to estimate the adversary's model parameters in a Hidden Markov model. In comparison, the current paper assumes a probabilistic map between π and a; develops Bayesian filtering algorithms for estimating the posterior along with MLE algorithms for θ, analyzes a sequential game and discusses optimizing the probe signals.
Section II addresses estimating the posterior of the posterior. Estimating/reconstructing the posterior given decisions based on the posterior is studied in microeconomics under the area of social learning [6] , [7] and game-theoretic generalizations [8] .
There strong parallels between inverse filtering and Bayesian social learning [6] as described in Section II-D; the key difference is that in social learning the aim is to estimate the underlying state given noisy posteriors, whereas our aim is to estimate the posterior given noisy measurements of the posterior and the underlying state. The recent paper [9] uses two cascaded Kalman filters in the context of LQG control over a communication channel where the transmitter uses predictive coding; the framework is different to ours and does not consider general Bayesian filters or estimation of the adversary's parameters.
Section III deals with constructing covariance bounds for a sequential localization game. [10] , [11] considers the model where we have access only to the noisy decisions of the enemy and shows the remarkable result that the covariance decreases as
) of a Kalman filter. The model we consider involves measurements from us and the enemy and the covariance is twice that of the Kalman filter.
Section IV considers maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of the adversary's observation likelihood given noisy measurements of its actions. This can be viewed abstractly as empirical Bayesian estimation in a dynamic hierarchical Bayesian network [12] ; however, to the best of our knowledge this has not been studied for dynamic partially observed models. Even for the linear Gaussian case, Section IV shows that the parameter estimation problem is non-trivial.
Finally, Section V discusses how to optimally probe the adversary to estimate its gain with minimum covariance. The first part develops a partial ordering (copositive dominance) for transition probability matrices of probe signals characterized by finite state Markov chains. This allows us to compare probe signals analytically in terms of their ability to extract information from the adversary. The analysis involves monotone likelihood ratio dominance of posterior probabilities and uses novel concepts from [1] , [13] ; likelihood ratio stochastic dominance is appropriate since it is closed under Bayesian updates [14] . The second part describes stochastic gradient algorithms to estimate the probe signal that minimize the covariance of the adversary's gain estimate. We use the SPSA algorithm [15] with a novel parametrization involving spherical coordinates from [16] .
II. OPTIMAL INVERSE FILTER FOR ESTIMATING BELIEF
Given the model (1) we now derive a filtering recursion for the posterior of the adversary's belief given knowledge of our state sequence and recorded actions. Accordingly, define
Note that the posterior α k (·) is a random measure since it is a posterior distribution of the adversary's posterior distribution (belief) π k . In the theorem below, we assume that the adversary's observations y k are from the probability density function B x k ,y .
Theorem 1: The posterior α k satisfies the following filtering recursion initialized by prior random measure α 0 = p(π 0 ):
Here y π k ,π is the observation such that π = T (π k , y) where T is the adversary's filter (2) . The conditional mean estimate 1 of the belief is E{π k+1 |a 1:k+1 , x 0:k+1 } = Π πα k+1 (π)dπ.
Proof: Start with the un-normalized density:
where I(·) denotes the indicator function. Finally, marginalizing 2 the above by integrating over y k+1 and then normalizing yields (3). The p(x k+1 |x k ) term cancels out after normalization.
We call (3) the optimal inverse filter since it yields the Bayesian posterior of the adversary's belief given our state and noisy measurements of the adversary's actions. At first sight, it appears that α k+1 does not depend on the transition kernel P . Actually α k+1 does depend on P since from (2), y π k ,π k+1 depends on P .
The rest of this section considers inverse filtering algorithms for evaluating α k (π) in (3) for the following 5 cases: 1) Inverse Hidden Markov filter (finite dimensional but exponential computational cost in time). 2) Inverse Kalman filter (finite dimensional sequence of Kalman filters). 3) Sequential Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC), i.e., particle filter for inverse filtering; the structure facilitates using the so called "optimal importance" function. 4) Inverse filtering in multi-agent social learning. 5) Inverse Bayesian localization involving conjugate priors (Gaussian likelihood and Gamma prior). These five cases are motivated by the corresponding five classical filtering and localization problems that have been widely studied in signal processing. The inverse HMM filter and inverse Kalman filter are obtained from the general recursion (3); and are essential in computing the MLE of the adversary's sensor gain in Section IV. In particle filtering, cases where it is possible to sample from the so called optimal importance function are of significant interest [17] . In our inverse filtering problem, we show that the optimal importance function can be determined due to the structure of the inverse filtering problem. The inverse filtering for social learning generalizes classical social learning in [6] where a deterministic function of the posterior is observed. Finally, the inverse Bayesian localization yields a tractable expression for the posterior in localization problems involving a Gaussian likelihood and Gamma prior.
A. Inverse Hidden Markov Model (HMM) Filter
We first illustrate the inverse filter (3) for the case where the adversary deploys a HMM filter.
. . , A}, implying that our state {x k , k ≥ 0} is a finite state Markov chain with transition matrix P and the adversary has finite valued HMM observations {y k , k ≥ 0} with observation probability B. Then T (π, y) in (2) is the classical HMM filter and the belief space Π is the unit X − 1 dimensional simplex, i.e., the space of X-dimensional probability vectors. Suppose (3) is initialized with α 0 (π) = δ(π − π 0 ), i.e., the prior is a Dirac-delta function placed at π 0 ∈ Π.
For k = 1, 2, . . . construct the finite sets Π k of belief states via the following recursion:
Note Π k has Y k elements. Using (3), the inverse HMM filter for estimating the belief reads: for π ∈ Π k+1 , the posterior and conditional mean are
Here Yπ ,π = {y : T (π, y) =π} and accounts for the fact that in finite observation spaces, multiple observations can result in the same Bayesian update, see Footnote 2. The inverse HMM filter (4) is a finite dimensional recursion, but the cardinality of Π k grows exponentially with k.
Numerical Examples: Consider X = {1, 2, 3}; then Π is the 2-dimensional unit simplex (equilateral triangle). Suppose and A = {1, 2}. Finally suppose our observations of the adversary's actions are specified by G such that where π * is a parameter that we will vary below. The adversary computes the belief π k of our state x k using the HMM filter. We compute the conditional mean estimateπ k of the adversary's belief using the inverse HMM filter (4). We computed the error π k −π k 2 . Fig. 2 displays these errors over the time horizon k = 1, . . . , 6 averaged over 1000 independent realizations for various values of π * . Given the noisy nature of the observations, choices of π * close to zero or one, result in actions by the adversary that contain less information about π. Therefore choices of π * close to zero or one yield a higher average error compared to π * = 0.5.
B. Inverse Kalman Filter
We consider a second special case of (3) where the inverse filtering problem admits a finite dimensional characterization in terms of the Kalman filter. Consider a linear Gaussian state space model
where
Based on observations y 1:k , the adversary computes the belief π k = N (x k , Σ k ) wherex k is the conditional mean state estimate and Σ k is the covariance; these are computed via the classical Kalman filter equations:
For localization problems, we will use the information filter form:
Similarly, the inverse Kalman filter in information form reads
The adversary then chooses its action asā k = φ(Σ k )x k for some pre-specified function 4 φ. We measure the adversary's action as
The Kalman covariance Σ k is deterministic and fully determined by the model parameters. So to estimate the belief
we only need to estimatex k at each time k given a 1:k , x 0:k . Substituting (5) for y k+1 in (8), we see that (8), (9) constitute a linear Gaussian system with un-observed statê x k , observations a k , and known exogenous input x k :
ψ k+1 is called the Kalman gain.
To summarize, our filtered estimate of the adversary's filtered estimatex k given measurements a 1:k , x 0:k is achieved by running "our" Kalman filter on the linear Gaussian state space model (10), wherex k , ψ k , Σ k in (10) are generated by the adversary's Kalman filter. Therefore, our Kalman filter uses the parameters
The equations of our inverse Kalman filter are: (12) Notex k andΣ k denote our conditional mean estimate and covariance of the adversary's conditional meanx k . The computational cost of the inverse Kalman filter is identical to the classical Kalman filter, namely O(X 2 ) computations at each time step.
C. Particle Filter for Inverse Filtering
In general the optimal inverse filter (3) does not have a finite dimensional statistic. Also, the inverse HMM filter (4) is intractable for large data lengths. One needs to resort to an approximation such as sequential MCMC. Here we describe a particle filter that uses the optimal importance function (i.e., minimizes the variance of the importance weights). Due to the different dependency structure compared to classical state space models (see Fig. 1 ), the updates for the importance weights given below are different compared to classical particle filters.
The particle filter constructs the N -point Dirac delta function approximation to the posterior as:
In complete analogy to the classical particle filter, we construct the sequential importance sampling update as follows:
The importance density q(·) is chosen such that
Then defining the importance weights (14) yield the following time recursion:
In particle filtering, it recommended to use the so called "optimal" importance density [17] , [18] , namely,
is straightforward to sample from. Also using q * , the importance weight update (15) becomes
In summary, the particle filtering algorithm becomes: Sequential Importance Sampling step: At each time k
• Update importance weights w (i) k using (15) or (16) . Resampling/Selection step: Multiply/Discard particles with high/low normalized importance weights to obtain N new particles with unit weight.
Finally, the particle filter estimate of the posterior
k . To summarize, the particle filter provides a tractable suboptimal algorithm for inverse filtering and we can sample from the optimal importance density. Recall [17] that the particle filter involves O(N ) computations at each iteration. 
D. Inverse Filtering for Multiagent Social Learning Models
Thus far we have considered inverse filtering based on the graphical model in Fig. 1 . Below, motivated by Bayesian social learning models in behavioral economics and sociology (which is also now popular in signal processing), we consider inverse filtering for the graphical model depicted in Fig. 3 . The adversary now is a multi-agent system that aims to estimate the state of "our" underlying Markov state x k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}. The key difference compared to Fig. 1 is that in Fig. 3 the previous action taken by the adversary directly affects the dynamics of the belief update. Such social learning is motivated by multi-agent decision making in social groups/networks and can result in spectacular behavior such as cascades and herding; see [19] for an extensive signal processing centric discussion.
1) Social Learning Protocol:
We start by describing the classic Bayesian social learning protocol. In social learning, the multiagent adversary learns (estimates) our state based on their observations of the state and actions taken by previous agents. Each agent takes an action u k once in a predetermined sequential order indexed by k = 1, 2, . . . The index k can also be viewed as the time instant when agent k acts. Assume at the beginning of iteration k, all agents have access to the public belief π k−1 defined in Step (iv) below.
The social learning protocol proceeds as follows [6] , [20] :
ii) Private Belief: Using the public belief π k−1 available at time k − 1 (Step (iv) below), agent k updates its private posterior belief η k (i) = P(x k = i|u 1 , . . . , u k−1 , y k ) using the classical Bayesian filter (2) which reads:
Here η k is an X-dimensional probability mass function (pmf). iii) Myopic Action: Agent k takes action
to minimize its expected cost
(18) Here c u = (c(i, u), i ∈ X ) denotes an X dimensional cost vector, and c(i, u) denotes the cost incurred when the underlying state is i and the agent chooses action u.
iv) Social Learning Filter: Given the action u k of agent k, and the public belief π k−1 , each subsequent agent k > k performs social learning to update the public belief π k according 6 to the "social learning filter":
where σ(π, u) = 1 R π u P π is the normalization factor of the Bayesian update. In (19) , the public belief
where I(·) is the indicator function and B y are the classical observation likelihoods is defined in (17) .
2) Inverse Social Learning Filter:
Given the above classical Bayesian social learning model, our aim is to estimate the public belief π k given the state sequence x 0:k and noisy measurements a 1:k of the agents actions u 1:k .
In order to proceed, first note that, as shown [21] , the social learning filter (19) has the following property: The belief space Π can be partitioned into A (possibly empty) subsets denoted
In complete analogy to Section II-A, we can now construct the inverse social learning filter: Let G u,a = P(a|u).
For k = 1, 2, . . . construct Π k via the following recursion:
Note Π k has A k elements. The inverse social learning filter computes the posterior α(π) and conditional mean of belief π ∈ Π k+1 as follows:
6 For the reader unfamiliar with social learning, the remarkable aspect of the social learning filter is that the likelihood R π u is an explicit function of the prior π; whereas in classical filtering the prior and likelihood are functionally independent. This dependence of the likelihood on the prior that causes social learning to have unusual behavior such as herding and information cascades.
Here Yπ ,π,u * is the set of observations for which (18) holds. Also u * (π, π) is the action such that π = T (π, u). The computational cost of the inverse social learning filter grows exponentially with the dimension A of the action space, i.e., O(A k ) with time k.
E. Inverse Bayesian Localization Using Conjugate Priors
We conclude this section by discussing a two-time scale inverse Bayesian localization problem. Recall that localization refers to the case where our state is a random variable x 0 instead of a random process.
1) Model: Assume our state is a finite valued; so x 0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X} is a random variable with prior π 0 . (The transition kernel P = I). The adversary aims to localize (estimate) our state based on noisy measurements that are exponentially distributed (this models the received radar signal power)
In (21), λ 0 defn = λ x 0 denotes the power gain parameter at the receiver when the true state is x 0 . Note that k indexes the slow time scale. The measurements y k are obtained by integrating the received power over a fast time scale defined below.
The adversary computes belief π k using the Bayesian filter (2) with P = I and observation kernel B x,y with parameter λ = (λ 1 , . . . , λ X ) . Letπ k (i) = p(x, y 1:k ) denote the un-normalized posterior density at time k. Since B xy is an exponential density, each element logπ k (i), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X} evolves with linear dynamics:
Equivalently, relative to some fixed location 1, defining Δ k (i) = logπ k (i) − logπ k (1), the dynamics of the adversary's belief update are given by the linear stochastic system
Let t = 1, . . . , T denote the fast time scale at each epoch k. We assume that our measurement of the adversary's radiated power in units of decibels (relative to location 1) at fast time scale
where μ i is the path loss and v t,k (i) is zero mean unit variance iid Gaussian. Equivalently the absolute power is proportional to exp(
is lognormal distributed. The intuition behind (24) is as follows: Since the adversary's radar radiates energy to location i proportional to π k (i), so our variance of the measurement noise is inversely proportional to π k (i). Hence the scaling of the noise variance by 1/Δ k (i) in (24) in log-scale.
2) Inverse Localization: The aim is to estimate adversary's relative belief Δ k given its observed actions a 1:T,k , i.e., compute p(Δ k |a 1:T,k ) given x 0 . Recall a 1:T,k = (a 1,k , . . . , a T,k ) .
Since {y n } are iid exponential distributed, hence S k has a Gamma distribution with pdf
The Gaussian likelihood (24) with Gamma prior for the precision (inverse of variance) form a Bayesian conjugate pair; implying that the posterior is also a Gamma distribution. Therefore, we have the following Bayesian estimator of the adversary's relative belief Δ k : Theorem 2: For the model (21), (22), (24), our posterior of the adversary's belief given a 1:T,k , x 0 has a Gamma density:
III. SEQUENTIAL LOCALIZATION GAME: COVARIANCE BOUNDS Suppose our state x 0 is a random variable and the adversary localizes our state via a Bayesian estimator. We observe the adversary's actions and estimate the adversary's belief. Since the adversary's belief π k converges to a Dirac mass centered on our state x 0 with probability one (under suitable regularity conditions), 7 our posterior α k (π) computed via the inverse filter, will also converge with probability one to a Dirac mass centered on x 0 . The question we address in this section is: How much slower is the convergence of our inverse filter compared to the adversary's Bayesian filter?
To make our analysis illustrative, throughout this section, we consider a scalar-valued localization problem with the inverse Kalman filter. Assume x 0 ∈ IR (scalar state), A = 1, C = 1, Q = 0, R = 1; so the adversary observes us with SNR 1. Assume the adversary's prior is non-informative; sox 0 = 0, Σ 0 = ∞.
A. Localization and Inverse Kalman Filter
We start with an elementary but useful observation. Using the information filter (6), it readily follows that the adversary's localization estimate iŝ Suppose we observe the adversary's action with SNR k = C 2 k /R k and initial conditionΣ 0 = ∞. Then the covariance of our estimate (using inverse Kalman filter (10)) of the adversary's belief evolves as
From (25), it is easily seen that
i.e., our covariance of the adversary's state estimate is strictly smaller than the adversary's covariance of our state.
B. Sequential Localization Game in Adversarial Setting
Inverse filtering discussed above involves cascaded optimal filters where the second filter uses the estimates generated by the first filter. We now outline a framework involving two cascaded Kalman filter where the first Kalman filter feeds its estimate to the second Kalman filter, and the second Kalman filter feeds its estimate to the first Kalman filter.
Thus far we assumed that x 0 is known to us and our aim was to estimate the adversary's estimate. In this section, our framework is different in two ways. First, we assume that neither us nor the adversary know the underlying state x 0 ∈ IR. For example, x 0 could denote the threat level of an autonomous unidentified drone hovering relative to a specific location as shown in Fig. 4 . Second, there is feedback; the adversary's action affects our estimate and our action affects the adversary's estimate. The setup is naturally formulated in game-theoretic terms. The adversary and us play a sequential game to localize (estimate) x 0 . 1) At odd time instants k = 1, 3, . . ., the adversary takes active measurements of the target and makes decisions based on its estimate. We eavesdrop on the adversary's decisions and apply Bayes rule to estimate (localize) the target's state x 0 . The details are as follows:
i) The adversary observes our action
. The adversary assumes that our state estimate is a k−1 .
ii) The adversary takes a direct measurement y k of x 0 and uses its Kalman filter (8) to update its state estimate:
where ψ k is the associated covariance update.
iii) The adversary then takes action u k =x k . This action minimizes the mean square error of the estimate.
iv) We eavesdrop on (observe) the adversary's action in noise as
We know z k ; u k−1 was our action at time k − 1, and a k is our measurement of the adversary's action at time k.
To summarize, at odd time instants, z k specified in (26) is our effective observation of the unknown state x 0 purely based on sensing the adversary's actions. 2) At even time instants k = 2, 4, . . . , we take active measurements y k of the target's state x 0 . Then we update our estimate of our target using the Kalman filter. The above setup constitutes a social learning sequential game [23] . Since the decisions are made myopically each time (to minimize the mean square error), the strategy profile at each time constitutes a Nash equilibrium. More importantly [ 
23, Theorem 5], the asymptotic behavior (in time) is captured by a social learning equilibrium (SLE).
Theorem 3: Consider the sequential game formulation for localizing the random variable state x 0 . Then for large k, the covariance of our estimate of the state x 0 is Σ k = 2 k −1 (which is twice the covariance for classical localization).
Remark: Theorem 3 has two interesting consequences.
1) The asymptotic covariance is independent of σ 2 (i.e. SNR of our observation of the adversary's action) as long as σ 2 > 0. If σ 2 = 0, there is a phase change and the covariance Σ k = k −1 as in the standard Kalman filter. 2) In the special case where only (26) is observed at each time (and the k−1 term is omitted), the formulation reduces to the Bayesian social learning problem of [6, Chapter 3] . In that case, [6, Proposition 3.1] shows that Σ k = O(k −1/3 ). The remarkable property is that this rate of slow learning is independent of the variance σ 2 as long as σ 2 is strictly positive [10] , [11] . As discussed in [6] , this result implies that models where one assumes that the enemy's action is observed perfectly are not robust; any noise in the observation process drastically reduces the rate of convergence of the estimator. To summarize, Theorem 3 confirms the intuition that sequentially learning the state indirectly from the adversary's actions (and the adversary learning the state from our actions) slows down the convergence of the localization estimator.
IV. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD PARAMETER ESTIMATION OF ADVERSARY'S SENSOR
So far we have discussed Bayesian estimation of the adversary's belief state. In comparison, this section considers parameter estimation. Our aim is to estimate the adversary's observation kernel B in (1) which quantifies the accuracy of the adversary's sensors. We assume that B is parametrized by an M -dimensional vector θ ∈ Θ where Θ is a compact subset of IR M . Denote the parametrized observation kernel as B θ . Assume that both us and the adversary know P (state transition kernel) 8 and G (probabilistic map from adversary's belief to its action). Then given our state sequence x 0:N and adversary's action sequence a 1:N , our aim is to compute the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE) of θ. That is, with L(θ) denoting the log likelihood, compute N , a 1:N |θ) .
A. General Purpose Optimization for MLE
The likelihood can be evaluated from the un-normalized version of the inverse filtering recursion (3) which reads
Given the un-normalized filtering recursion (27) , the log likelihood is the normalization term at time N :
Given (28), the MLE can be computed using a general purpose numerical optimization algorithm such as fmincon in Matlab. This uses the interior reflective Newton method [24] for large scale problems and sequential quadratic programming [25] for medium scale problems. In general L(θ) is non-concave in θ and the constraint set Θ is non-convex. So the algorithm at best will converge to a local stationary point of the likelihood function.
General purpose optimizers such as fmincon in Matlab allow for the gradient ∇ θ L(θ) and Hessian ∇ 2 θ L(θ) of the likelihood as inputs to the algorithm. These are typically computed via the so called sensitivity equations. For the general inverse filtering problem, the sensitivity equations are formidable.
Remark. EM Algorithm: The Expectation Maximization (EM) algorithm is a popular numerical algorithm for computing the MLE especially when the Maximization (M) step can be computed in closed form. It is widely used for computing the MLE of the parameters of a linear Gaussian state space model [26] , [27] . Unfortunately, for estimating the adversary's observation model, due to the time evolving dynamics in (11), the EM algorithm is not useful since the M-step involves a non-convex optimization that cannot be done in closed form. There is no obvious way of choosing the latent variables to avoid this non-convexity.
B. Estimating Adversary's Gain Matrix in Linear Gaussian Case
Consider the setup in Section II-B where our dynamics are linear Gaussian and the adversary observes our state linearly in Gaussian noise (5) . The adversary estimates our state using a Kalman filter, and we estimate the adversary's estimate using the inverse Kalman filter (10) . Using (28) , (10), (11) , the log likelihood for the adversary's observation gain matrix θ = C based on our measurements is (29) where ι k are the innovations of the inverse Kalman filter (12) . In (29) , our state x k−1 is known to us and therefore is a known exogenous input. Also note from (11) thatĀ k ,F k are explicit functions of C, whileC k andQ k depend on C via the adversary's Kalman filter.
The following known result summarizes the consistency of the MLE for the for the adversary's gain matrix C in the linear Gaussian case.
Theorem 4: Assume that A is stable, and the state space model (5) is an identifiable minimal realization (which implies controllability and observability). Then the adversary's Kalman filter variables K k , ψ k , Σ k converge to steady state values geometrically fast in k [28] implying that asymptotically the system (10) is stable linear time invariant. Also, the MLE θ * (maximizer for (29) ) for the adversary's observation matrix C using (10) is unique and a strongly consistent estimator [29] .
Numerical Examples: To provide insight, Fig. 5 displays the log-likelihood versus adversary's gain matrix C using (29) in the scalar case. The parameters in the simulation are A = 0.4, Q = 2, R = 1, σ 2 = 1 in (9) with N = 1000. The four sub-figures correspond to true values of C o = 0.5, 1, 5, 2, 3 respectively. Each sub-figure in Fig. 5 has two plots. The plot in red is the log-likelihood of C ∈ (0, 10] evaluated based on the adversary's observations using the standard Kalman filter. (This is the classical log-likelihood of the observation gain of a Gaussian state space model.) The plot in blue is the log-likelihood of C ∈ (0, 10] computed using (29) based on our measurements of the adversary's action using the inverse Kalman filter (where the adversary first estimates our state using a Kalman filter) -we call this the inverse case. Fig. 5 shows that the log likelihood in the inverse case (blue plots) has a less pronounced maximum compared to the standard case (red plots). This implies that numerical algorithms for computing the MLE of the enemy's gain using our observations of the adversary's actions (via the inverse Kalman filter) will converge much more slowly than the classical MLE (which uses the adversary's observations). This is intuitive -our estimate of the adversary's parameter is based on the adversary's estimate of our state -so there is more noise to contend with.
Cramer Rao (CR) bounds: Is it instructive to compare the CR bounds for MLE of C for the classic model versus that of the inverse Kalman filter model. Table I displays the CR bounds (reciprocal of expected Fisher information) for the four examples considered above evaluated using via the algorithm in [30] . It shows that the covariance lower bound for the inverse case is substantially higher than that for the classic case. This is again consistent with the intuition that estimating the adversary's parameter based on its actions (which is based on its estimate of us) is more difficult than directly estimating C in a classical state space model. Fig. 5 . Log-Likelihood as a function of enemy's gain C ∈ (0, 10] when true value is C o . The red curves denote the log-likelihood of C given the enemy's measurements. The blue curves denotes the log-likelihood of C using the inverse Kalman filter given our observations of the enemy's action. The plots show that it is more difficult to compute the MLE for the inverse filtering problem due to the almost flat likelihood (blue curves) compared to red curves. Thus far we have discussed estimating the adversary's belief state and observation matrix. This section deals with optimal probing also known as input (experimental) design [31] for the inverse Hidden Markov Model case. Suppose our probe signal {x k } is a finite state Markov chain with transition matrix P . Recall from (1) that the adversary observes x k via observation probabilities B and deploys a Bayesian filter (involving P, B) to compute its belief π k , then chooses action u k that we observe as a k . This section addresses the question: How should we choose the transition matrix P of our probe signal x k to minimize the covariance of our estimate of the adversary's observation kernel B?
Below we consider two approaches. The first approach is analytical -using stochastic dominance, we establish a partial ordering amongst probe transition matrices which results in a corresponding ordering of our SNR of the adversary's actions. The second approach is numerical -we describe a stochastic gradient algorithm to estimate the probe transition matrix that minimizes the variance of our MLE of B.
A. Stochastic Dominance Ordering of Optimal Probing Transition Matrices
In this subsection, we construct a partial ordering for transition matrices P of our probe signal x k which results in a corresponding ordering of our SNR of the adversary's action. The result is useful since computing the optimal P is non-trivial, yet we can compare the SNRs to two different probing signals without brute force computations. Note that maximizing this SNR can be viewed as a surrogate for minimizing the covariance of our estimate of the adversary's observation kernel B.
1) Assumptions:
We assume (these assumptions are discussed below) A1) P is totally positive of order 2, see [1] , [32] . That is every second order minor of P is non-negative. A2) The adversary chooses action u k = φ(g π k ) where g is a vector with increasing elements and φ is any increasing non-negative function (e.g. quantizer). Recall the adversary observes x k as y k and computes its Bayesian belief π k via (2) using the transition matrix P . Given our observation a k = u k + k of the adversary's action u k , define the signal to noise ratio
2) Copositive Dominance and Monotone Likelihood Ratio Dominance: In order to compare SNR(P ) for different probing transition matrices P , we introduce two definitions: copositive dominance of transition matrices and monotone likelihood ratio dominance of beliefs.
Copositivity generalizes positive semi-definiteness. Recall a symmetric square matrix L is positive semi-definite if π Lπ ≥ 0 for all π ∈ IR X . In comparison, a matrix L is copositive if π Lπ ≥ 0 for all X-dimensional probability vectors π.
Given two transition matrices P (1) and P (2), define the matrices
Definition 5 (Copositive Ordering of Transition Matrices [1] ): Given two transition matrices P (1) and P (2), we say that P (1) is copositively dominated by P (2), denoted as
Next we define the monotone likelihood ratio partial order for probability mass functions.
Definition 6 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) Dominance):
Let π 1 , π 2 ∈ Π be any two probability vectors. Then π 1 is greater than π 2 with respect to the MLR ordering -denoted as π 1 ≥ lr π 2 -if
Similarly
The MLR stochastic order is useful in a Bayesian context since it is closed under conditional expectations. That is, X ≥ lr Y implies E{X|F} ≥ lr E{Y |F} for any two random variables X, Y and sigma-algebra F [13] .
Discussion of Assumptions: (A1) is widely used in Markov chain structural analysis; see [1] for specific examples and also the classic paper [32] . (A2) says that larger beliefs (wrt MLR order) of the adversary correspond to larger actions taken by the adversary. This implies that u is increasing with our state x. For example, if x denote the threat levels perceived by the adversary, then the larger our state, the larger the adversary's action.
3) Main Result: With the above definitions, we are now ready to state the main result of this subsection.
As shown in [1] , copositive dominance is a sufficient condition for the one step Bayesian belief updates (2) using P (1) and P (2), respectively, to satisfy T (π, y; P (1)) ≤ lr T (π, y, P (2)) where ≤ lr denotes likelihood ratio dominance. Assumption (A1) globalizes this assertion and implies that adversary's beliefs for transition matrices P (1) and P (2) satisfy π
for all time k. This implies that E{u 2 k } using P (1) is smaller than that using P (2). We summarize this argument as the following result.
Theorem 7: Suppose transition matrices P (1), P (2) satisfy (A1), (A2) and P (1) P (2) (copositive ordering). Then 1) The belief updates using transition matrices P (1) and P (2) satisfy: π
for all time k. 2) Therefore, our probe signal {x k } generated with transition matrix P (1) incurs a smaller signal to noise ratio compared to probe signal with transition matrix P (2) , that is, SNR(P (1)) ≤ SNR(P (2)). To put the above theorem in context, note that evaluating SNR(P ) is non-trivial due to multiple levels of dynamics and dependencies: P determines our probe signal; then the adversary observes our probe signal in noise, computes the posterior (using the Bayesian filter (2) with transition matrix P ) and then responds with an action u k generated according to (A2) which we observe in noise. Despite this complexity, the theorem says that we can impose a partial order on the probe transition matrices P resulting in a corresponding ordering of the SNR of our observation of the adversary's action (which is a surrogate for the covariance of our estimate of B).
4) Examples:
We start with 2-state examples of (A1) and copositive dominance P (1) P (2) for illustrative purposes; see [1] for several high dimensional examples:
For examples (i) and (ii) above, (A1) and copositive dominance holds; so if (A2) also holds then Theorem 7 holds. Numerical Example: To illustrate numerically how the SNR in (30) behaves with P , we ran a numerical simulation where our Markov chain {x k } evolves with transition matrix
Then clearly (A1) holds. Furthermore is easily shown that copositive dominance P (p) P (p) holds for p ≤p. Suppose the adversary observes {x k } in additive iid zero mean Gaussian noise with variance σ v (adversary's observation noise variance); this can be proved using Blackwell dominance [1] , [33] .
We now illustrate Theorem 7 with higher dimensional examples.
Example 1. Optimizing Probe Signal with Stopping Probability Constraints: Let state 1 denote the stopping (absorbing state). The transition matrix of our probe signal is of the form where θ i ∈ [0, 1/(X − 1)], i = 2, . . . , X so that P (θ) is a valid stochastic matrix. Then (A1) holds. Also P (θ) P (θ) for θ <θ elementwise.
If state 1 is viewed as sending no probe signal, then the probe signal stops (to maintain a low probability of intercept constraint) at a random time whose expected value is determined by θ i . The larger θ i is chosen, the higher the SNR of the adversary.
Example 2. Monotone Likelihood Ratio (MLR) ordered probability vectors: Suppose we have L probability vectors v i each of dimension X that are MLR ordered (see Definition 6), i.e.
We need to choose X vectors out of these L vectors to construct the transition matrix of our probe signal. Then the optimal probability vectors to choose for the transition matrix are
. It can be shown that (A1) holds and P (2) copositively dominates any other transition matrix P (1) constructed from vectors v 1 , . . . , v L−X . Thus Theorem 7 implies that P (2) yields the probe signal with the optimal SNR.
In summary, this subsection presented a partially ordering for the transition matrices of probe signals which resulted in a corresponding ordering of SNRs (surrogate for the covariance of our estimate of the adversary's sensor gain).
B. Stochastic Gradient Algorithm for Optimizing Probe
The previous subsection presented an analytical framework for characterizing the probe signals in terms of the SNR (30). Here we consider a different metric, namely, choosing the probe signal to minimize the variance of the MLE. We present a stochastic gradient algorithm to solve the following stochastic optimization problem: Given our state sequence x 0:N and observations of the adversary's actions a 1:N , find the transition matrix P * of our probe signal that minimizes the variance of our estimate of the adversary's likelihood B: Step 1: Choose initial parameter θ (0) .
Step 2: For iterations I = 0, 1, 2, . . .
• Simulate system (1) and generate action sequence a
I (i) = −1 with probability 0.5 +1 with probability 0.5. .
Here Δ n = Δ/(n + 1) γ denotes the gradient step size with 0.5 ≤ γ ≤ 1 and Δ > 0.
• Update estimate via stochastic gradient algorithm
HereB is our MLE of B given (x 0:N , a 1:N ) computed using the inverse HMM filter (see Section IV) and Var(B) denotes the empirical variance. Fig. 7 shows the schematic of our setup. The stochastic optimization (33) can be solved using a stochastic gradient algorithm. The key issue is to estimate the gradient of the covariance of the MLE B * wrt θ. Algorithm 1 uses one possible stochastic gradient algorithm, called the Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (SPSA) algorithm [15] to generate a sequence of estimates θ (I) , I = 1, 2, . . . , that converges to a local stationary point of the objective J(P ) defined in (33) .
The SPSA Algorithm 1 [15] picks a single random direction d n along which direction the derivative is evaluated at each batch n. To evaluate the gradient estimate ∇ θ J (I) in (34), SPSA requires only 2 batch simulations, i.e., the number of evaluations is independent of dimension of parameter θ. This is in contrast to the classical Kiefer Wolfowitz gradient algorithm where the number of batch simulations to estimate the gradient is proportional to the dimension of θ. Algorithm 1 converges to a local stationary point optimum of objective J(P ) (defined in (33)) with probability one. This is a straightforward application of techniques in [35] (which gives general convergence methods for Markovian dependencies).
Note that (33) is a constrained optimization problem since P needs to be a valid stochastic matrix. We use the following trick to re-parametrize the problem as an unconstrained optimization. We parametrize P using spherical coordinates: Let θ ij ∈ IR for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , X}, j = {1, . . . , X − 1} and define the parametrized transition matrix P (θ) as
Note that even though θ is unconstrained, is straightforwardly verified that P (θ) is a valid stochastic matrix.
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C. Optimal Probing. Numerical Example
The following example puts together the three key components of this paper (inverse filtering, ML estimation of adversary, and optimal probing) in an illustrative setting. Fig. 7 shows the schematic setup. The main conclusion is that by choosing our probe transition probabilities P optimally, the variance of our MLE of the adversary's sensor probabilities can be reduced by almost 10 times! With X = Y = A = {1, 2}, consider the optimal probing problem with model parameters
Here p ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter in our transition matrix P which specifies our Markov probe signal {x k }. Our Markov probe signal is observed by the adversary with true observation probability B parametrized by b = 0.6. The adversary then uses the HMM filter on these noisy observations to compute beliefs {π k }. We do not know the adversary's observation matrix B. The aim is to solve (33) , namely, choose probe probability p in P to minimize the variance of the MLE of B.
First, we ran a brute force algorithm to evaluate this variance at various values of p as follows. By observing batches of the adversary's actions a k of length 10, we use the inverse HMM filter to compute the MLE of B as described in Section IV. For each choice of probe probability p, we compute the empirical variance of this MLE over 200 such independent batches. This yields our estimate of E x 0:N ,a 1:N {Var(B)}. Fig. 8 displays the variance of the MLE versus probe signal probability p.
We can draw two conclusions from Fig. 8 . 9 This approach is based on elementary differential geometry and is equivalent to constraining the derivative to a manifold that ensures the stochastic gradient update yields a valid transition matrix [34] For X = 2, the parametrization yields [
] which is always a valid transition matrix. Another possibility is to use logistic functions. Fig. 8 . Variance of our MLE of adversary's observation matrix B versus our probe signal probability p defined in (36). The dots indicate the variance for each value of p after 200 independent simulations. The smooth curve is an interpolation and indicates the presence of several local minima. Fig. 9 . Sample path of SPSA Algorithm 1 to estimate optimal probe probability p to achieve objective (33). 1) By choosing p ≈ 0.7, the variance of the MLE is more than 10 times smaller than for p = 0.1. This indicates that optimizing the probe signal is essential in adversarial signal processing problems. 2) The plot of E x 0:N ,a 1:N {Var(B)} as a function of p has several local maxima. This implies that any hill climbing stochastic optimization algorithm (such as SPSA) will converge to a local maximum. Next we ran SPSA Algorithm 1 to adaptively estimate the probe probability p in (36) that achieves objective (33) . The step size parameters were chosen as suggested by [15] and https://www.jhuapl.edu/SPSA/PDF-SPSA/MatlabAuto_gain_sel-b-w.pdf as Δ = −0.05, = 0.01, ζ = 0.602, γ = 0.101. Fig. 9 displays the sample path of estimates p (I) vs iteration I of a typical run of the algorithm initialized at p (0) = 0.75. Despite the complexity of the setup (HMM filter, inverse HMM filter, decision maker, etc.), the stochastic gradient algorithm adapts the probe probability p to achieve reasonable performance (local minimum).
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper is an early step towards understanding adversarial signal processing problems in counter-autonomous systems.
Summary: We presented four main results. In Section II, we formulated the problem of inverse filtering, namely, estimating the adversary's filtered density (posterior) given noisy measurements (adversary's actions), when the adversary itself runs a Bayesian filter to estimate our state. Specifically, Theorem 1 gave a recursion to compute posterior α k of enemy's belief π k with the following dependence structure:
The inverse Kalman filter, inverse HMM filter and inverse social learning filters are exact in the sense that they estimate the posterior α k without approximation. The resulting conditional mean estimate E{π k+1 |a 1:k+1 , x 0:k+1 } is the minimum mean square estimate of the adversary's belief. The inverse particle filter is suboptimal, and various bounds can be obtained [17] .
Second, Section III discussed sequential localization as a game between us and the adversary. The convergence of the inverse filter is slower compared to the adversary's Bayesian filter. Theorem 3 specified the explicit rate of convergence.
Third, Section IV discussed how to compute the maximum likelihood estimate of the adversary's observation matrix using the inverse filter, i.e., estimate MLE of the adversary's observation matrix B given measurements {x k , a k }. This allows us to calibrate the accuracy of the adversary's sensor and therefore estimate its sensor capability. For the linear Gaussian case, consistency of the MLE is specified by Theorem 4.
Finally, Section V discussed how to adapt (control) our state to probe the adversary's sensor to minimize the covariance of our estimate of the adversary's observation likelihood. The covariance of our MLE of B in step 2 depends on our probe signal transition matrix P . Optimal probing deals with choosing P to minimize this covariance. Specifically, Theorem 7 gave a partial ordering of the transition matrices which results in a corresponding ordering of the SNR. Section V-B gave a stochastic gradient algorithm to estimate a local minimum of the covariance of the MLE. Finally, Section V-C gave a numerical example which shows that optimizing the probe signal, the variance of the MLE can be significantly reduced.
Extensions: Estimating the posterior distribution and sensor gain of the adversary is a difficult problem. In general identifiability issues can arise for estimating the adversary's sensor gain. Also geometric ergodicity (stability) of the inverse filter, that is, the inverse filter forgets its initial condition geometrically fast, is difficult to establish. There are several interesting extensions that can be considered in future work. One area is to study the effect of missing data on inverse filtering. Another area is to study the convergence properties of the maximum likelihood estimate to the CRB for the inverse filtering case, i.e., sample complexity results for the error variance to converge to the CRB. Another extension is to estimate the utility function of the adversary based on its response, using for example, revealed preferences from microeconomics. Finally, a careful dynamic game theoretic formulation of counter-autonomous systems is of interest, where the specific forward and backward physical channel responses are considered.
APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 3:
Our update dynamics via the Kalman filter are:
• At odd time instants, using effective observation z k (from the adversary) our state estimate and covariance evolves aŝ
Note: Even though z k has k and k−1 , since the update only happens every two time steps (odd times), they are statistically independent of k+2 and k+1 in z k+2 .
• At even time instants, using our own observation y k ,
To analyze the convergence rate, consider the precision matrix
k . The combined covariance update of (37), (38) is P k+2 = P k + 1 + 1 1 + σ 2 (2 + P k ) 2 1 + (1 − (P k + 2) −1 ) 2 (39) Thus asymptotically P k = O(k) and Σ k = O(k −1 ). However, the initial behavior of the covariance exhibits slower decrease due to the last term in (39). It is straightforward (but tedious) to show that for large k, Σ k = 2/k.
Proof of Theorem 7: Let π P (1) k and π P (2) k , denote the posteriors computed using Bayesian filter (2) with transition matrices P (1) and P (2) respectively, initialized with common prior π 0 . Under (A1), it follows from [1, Theorem 10.6.1] that copositive dominance P (1) P (2) implies the following sample path likelihood ratio dominance: π
for all time k where ≤ lr denotes monotone likelihood ratio dominance. Since likelihood ratio dominance implies first order stochastic dominance [13] , it follows that under (A2) that g π
From (A2) φ(·) is non-negative and increasing, and so u
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